Security Implications of the Russian
Identity Crisis
Eduard Ponarin
June 1999
PONARS Policy Memo 64
European University at St. Petersburg
Introduction
Western policymakers and their scholarly advisers seem to focus primarily on the
oligarchical interests of the Russian elite rather than on long-range societal processes.
This memo is an attempt to assess the potential of ideational sources of Russian interests
from a broader sociological perspective. It is important to understand that the search for a
Russian national identity is not merely driven by cynical elites, but arises from a genuine
need within Russian society.
The inefficiency of the Soviet system led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and made
the Soviet identity unappealing. Each national republic that had (in many cases due to
Soviet policies), developed its own national identity by the 1990s easily shook off the
superficial and amorphous Soviet identity that had become odious and irrelevant. For
Russians, however, national identity still remains uncertain. Weak before the creation of
the Soviet Union and tightly bound with the Soviet vision, Russia’s weak identity became
even less clear after the Soviet collapse.
This situation of uncertainty will not last forever. The present time in Russia is of crucial
importance as a formative period. Similar processes in turn-of-the-century China and
nineteenth century Germany were completed in twenty and fifty years, respectively. Once
established, national identities persist: in the case of Germany, its national identity
influenced Franco-German relations from the Franco-Prussian War to World War II. The
danger of Russia’s current formative period is that it coincides with an anti-American and
anti-democratic tide in Russian public opinion. It may solidify the image of the West (and
in particular the US) as Russia’s national enemy, and define Russo-American relations for
some years to come. Yet because this is a formative period, some changes in US policy in
Russia could turn back the tide. This memo suggests some strategic changes in US public
relations policies to further that goal.
Why is the Identity of Ordinary Russians Important?
While analysts often assume that amorphous and immobile masses can be structured and
moved only by the elite, it is often the case that various competing elites try to outbid
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each other using ideas and rhetoric in their pursuit of power. For instance, the ethnic
conflict between Armenians and Azeris over Karabagh was mass-led, rather than eliteled.
Different Armenian elites and counterelites successively presented increasingly
radical nationalist agendas that soon matched the radicalism of the Armenian nationalist
masses (the elite followed, rather than led, society into nationalism).
This situation can be pictured as a marketplace where “masses” are potential buyers with
a certain demand and elites are competing sellers whose profit is political power. Those
who manage to supply better than other competitors gain the profit. From this
perspective, Russian national identity is not only a matter of existentialist Dostoyevskystyle
philosophizing about the essence of the Russian soul, but may also become a massbased
driving force for action and for change.
To be sure, sellers may sometimes agree to fix prices, and elites may agree on certain
rules that limit the boundaries of competition, such as those in a democracy. But trust is
difficult to establish and maintain in an emerging marketplace where there are incentives
to break the rules for short-term gain. For example, the Bolsheviks in 1917 outbid other
parties in part because they were willing to promise land at no cost and to unilaterally
withdraw from World War I, something that all other parties felt inhibited about, but the
peasant masses desperately wanted.
Sellers can sometimes shape demand, rather than just passively responding. But once a
demand exists, it usually takes on a life and effect of its own. It may well be the case that
many current Russian elites would like to maintain friendly relations with the US.
However, as rational actors in a competitive situation, they cannot help but notice that lip
service to Russian national interests–and increasingly Russian nationalism–pays off
because responsiveness to Russian nationalism brings societal support. Taken to its
logical conclusion, what began as a rhetorical exercise merely for political positioning in
a competitive environment produces increasingly assertive rhetoric that may ultimately
result in corresponding actions.
Is There an Identity Crisis?
Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the term “Russian” was defined in
opposition to the term “Soviet.” Russia was also defined as a nation in transition to
democracy, a prodigal son coming back to the family of Western nations. This anti-
Soviet, pro-Western, and democratic ideal was symbolized by former Foreign Minister
Kozyrev. However, democratic reforms have not delivered good lives to people, and
Russians increasingly perceive the West, and the US in particular, as not exactly an allforgiving
loving father.
Accordingly, there has been a dramatic change in public opinion: “democracy” and “the
West” are now seen in very negative terms by increasing segments of Russian society.
The change in Russian public opinion has occurred in spite of Western humanitarian aid,
financial loans, and a Russian media that is on the whole pro-democratic. What causes
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such radical changes? The answer is in the particular form and content of the emerging
national sentiment of the Russian people.
Many students of Russian nationalism agree that Russians–as the traditionally dominant
imperial group–have had only a vague ethnic awareness and have identified primarily
with the state, rather than their ethnic group. This follows from theories that relate the
rise of nationalism to the emergence in a modernizing multi-ethnic state of a single
standardized culture that allows even perfect strangers to easily get along in formal
contexts. Those who, for whatever reasons, cannot easily adopt this new culture or who
are simply excluded from it by the dominant group, are put in the humiliating position of
a second-rate citizen struggling with hostile bureaucracy. These individuals become
acutely aware of the difference between the standard culture and their own–that is, they
become nationalists.
Russians have easily identified with standard, dominant Russian cultures–be they
Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial or Russian Soviet. It was other peoples of the
empire, in particular Moslem and Western Christian (Roman Catholic and Protestant),
who had problems. This is why Russians did not have a strong ethnic identity, whereas
their many non-Russian neighbors did. However, this has been changing lately.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russians have encountered a powerful, alien culture that
makes them feel powerless, disadvantaged, and inferior. Globalization has nurtured the
emergence of a global culture rooted in North-European Protestant ethic and epitomized
by US culture. Many Russians who encounter this new standard culture find it alien and
exclusionary. Yet because of the nature of globalization they cannot avoid it and are
confronted by it every day: on television, in print media, in advertising, and with the
appearance of Western financial and economic companies in some Russian cities. This
hostile culture is frequently encountered at the entrance to US consulates throughout
Russia, which is unfortunate since one would expect those Russians seeking a US visa to
be most sympathetic to the West.
The difficulty Russians experience with this new culture can be explained by three
factors:
1. The cultures are very different. Among Western nations, Great Britain has few
problems with this global culture, while France experiences conflict, as well as
some anti-American attitudes. The cultural distance for Russia is far greater than
for France: consider how different are Russian and English, Protestantism and
Orthodoxy, American suburbia and Russian villages, and American and Russian
gender relations.
2. While European countries associate globalization with good economic prospects,
military security, and other advantages that may induce even the French to
swallow the burger, as it were, Russians associate pro-Western reforms with
economic hardship and Russia’s loss of global prestige.
3. NATO expansion, followed by the action in Yugoslavia that sidelined both the
UN Security Council and Russia makes Russians fear not only a loss of prestige,
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but also for the security of their country. How can Russians identify with a culture
that does not want them, and seems to threaten them?
Security Implications for the West
While older segments of the Russian population are becoming increasingly nostalgic
about the Soviet past, the younger generation of Russians is more prone to look for a
nationalist answer. Even Lenin’s internationalist Soviet Communist Party has become in
the Russian context more and more nationalist. Among the major prospective presidential
candidates all but Grigoriy Yavlinsky are using nationalist rhetoric. It makes one wonder
if this is why Yavlinsky’s chances are slim.
Currently there are two distinct nationalist approaches to the concept of Russian identity.
On one hand, there are people with views like those of former Prime Minister Yevgeniy
Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov who may be termed “derzhavniki” or state
nationalists. Then there are ethnic nationalists, like Krasnodar Governor Nikolai
Kondratenko and the leader of RNE (a neo-fascist party), Alexander Barkashov. While
both kinds of nationalism may seem undesirable, there are important differences between
the two versions. State nationalism defines Russian identity in terms that are as close to
the European idea of a civic nation as one can possibly get in modern Russia. Most
importantly, this is an inclusive definition that, projected into the future, gives hope for a
peaceful coexistence of the numerous ethnic groups inhabiting the still vast Russian
territory. While state nationalists are more assertive and vocal about Russian national
interests than Kozyrev was, they would still like to see Russia integrated within a world
community ruled by international laws.
The alternative, ethnic definition of Russian identity is by blood. While currently state
nationalists have much better chances of coming to power in Russia in the 1999-2000
elections than the proponents of ethnic nationalism, it is not inconceivable to picture the
latter’s success around 2008 or even 2004, if the derzhavnik leadership were to fail in
reversing Russia’s economic collapse. Considering the current state of the Russian
economy, such a failure is quite likely. Coupled with the trend from a democratic and
pro-Western attitude towards its opposite, the 2004/2008 scenario is especially pregnant
with security implications for the Western countries, as well as for many of Russia’s
neighbors.
As the experience of Turkey early this century suggests, even a relatively successful
attempt to turn a multi-ethnic empire into an ethnically defined nation-state may have
disastrous consequences for numerous ethnic minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, and
Kurds. Russian ethnic nationalists in power would probably be no better than their
Turkish counterparts. They would make anti-Semitism a formal or informal government
policy. They would try to crack down on the ethnic republics’ autonomy and possibly
implement russification policies. Irredentist policies with respect to the so-called “near
abroad” would also be likely. All these policies would likely cause Russia’s international
isolation. But that would also justify the nationalist prophecy about the inimical West,
and push Russia towards alliance with states like Iran. In short, Russia would turn into a
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huge, nuclear-armed rogue state with ethnic conflicts simmering within and beyond its
borders.
This is why the choice that ordinary Russians will make during the next few years
between the two versions of national identity is of crucial importance and long-term
significance.
Going back to my market analogy, it seems that Western policies with respect to Russian
public opinion–to the extent they exist–have concentrated on their existing supply.
Western media such as Radio Liberty offers the Russian public a variety of alternative–
but never nationalist–opinions, perhaps in the hope that they can thus reverse the
nationalist tide. However, by ignoring the existing and rapidly developing public demand
at a time when even mainstream Russian media are turning nationalist, they lose their bid.
For the most part, recent efforts of the Western media in Russia have been either
negligent or counterproductive. Propaganda can be a powerful tool, but not when it is
completely insensitive to its audience.
Rather than continue to ignore the demand or be the last to passively follow it, the West
should try and take an active stance to help Russians make the better choice out of the
two nationalist alternatives. The potentially huge resources of the West in terms of
Russian public opinion may make the difference if the West can present itself as caring
for Russian national interests and the moderate version of Russian national identity–state
or civic nationalism. While opposing fascism from the platform of Kozyrev no longer
makes sense, doing so from the platform of Luzhkov does.
To engage Russian public opinion, a concerted effort is needed with respect to the mass
media, especially television. Virtually 100% of the Russian population has access to
television, including those living in remote areas that are rarely visited by a Westerner.
Television is the major source of news and entertainment for most Russians. Investing in
media programs that work to communicate the positive connections between Russian
culture with its global counterpart could be effective if sensitive to Russian concerns and
perspectives.
Cooperation of Russian elites is crucial to engaging the Russian public. For that reason,
the West should consider supporting expressions of civic Russian national identity, and
recognize that elites who “sell” this idea are meeting a genuine demand for a moderate
nationalism. The best support the West can provide would be sensitivity to Russian
national interests and Russian public opinion.
 PONARS 1999